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Abstract: In this paper, we investigate substitution/complementarity relationships among 
products sold with different bundled characteristics and under different vertical arrangements.  
Our conceptual model demonstrates the interactive price impacts emanating from product 
differentiation, market concentration and market size.  The model is applied to the U.S. 
cottonseed market using transaction level data from 2002 to 2007.  This market has been 
impacted structurally in numerous ways due to the advances and the rapid adoption of seeds with 
differing bundles of biotechnology traits and vertical penetration emanating from the 
biotechnology seed industry.  Several interesting findings are reported. The econometric 
investigation finds evidence of sub-additive pricing in the bundling of patented biotech traits. 
Vertical organization is found to affect pricing and the exercise of market power. While higher 
market concentration is associated with higher prices, there is also evidence of cross-product 
complementarity effects that lead to lower prices. Simulation methods are developed to measure 
the net price effects.  These simulations are applicable for use in pre-merger analysis of 
industries producing differentiated products and exhibiting similar market complexities.  
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  11.  Introduction 
 
It is common for firms to produce multiple products. Firms that engage in successive 
stages of production and marketing of these products must choose among alternative forms of 
vertical organization, including arms-length transactions, contracting, and vertical ownership (i.e. 
forward or backward vertical integration). At each step along the vertical channel there is the 
potential for horizontal competition in which firms develop strategies for pricing and product 
design that can involve bundling or tie-in sales of their various products. Much research has 
examined the economic incentives underlying these choices (see Lafontaine and Slade, 2007 for 
an overview of this literature).      
Beginning with Williamson (1968), the influence of horizontal and vertical structures on 
end product pricing has been an area of intense legal and economic debate (e.g., Hart and Tirole 
1990; Ordover et al. 1990; O’Brien and Shaffer 1992; McAfee and Schwartz 1994; De Fontenay 
and Gans 2005; Gans 2007; Rey and Tirole 2008). On the one hand, the exercise of market 
power associated with tacit collusion, exclusive dealing, vertical foreclosure, and increased 
concentration through mergers can lead to market inefficiency. This has motivated government 
actions through antitrust legislation and enforcement. On the other hand, proponents of the 
“Chicago School” approach have argued that increased horizontal concentration or vertical 
integration can be motivated by efficiency gains. Firms with superior technologies, human 
capital, or business models are perceived to expand by purchasing the assets of poor performers 
or by driving these firms out of business.  As a result, increased horizontal concentration or 
vertical integration may not lead to welfare losses (Bork 1978). This focus on efficiency gains 
has contributed to reduced antitrust enforcement in the US over the last two decades (Pitofsky 
2008). 
  2While previous literature has examined the economics of industry concentration and 
efficiency gains from horizontal and vertical restructuring,
2 studying the tradeoffs between 
market power and efficiency remains challenging in markets involving differentiated products 
(e.g., Spengler 1950; Katz 1989; Hart and Tirole 1990; Whinston 2006; Rey and Tirole 2008). 
Addressing these challenges is relevant given the prevalence of product differentiation in many 
industries. And it appears timely given the recent call for more vigorous antitrust enforcement by 
the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) (Varney 2009).  
This paper examines end product pricing in horizontal and vertical markets both 
conceptually and empirically. We develop a Cournot model of pricing of differentiated products 
under imperfect competition in different vertical organizations. The model demonstrates how 
substitution/complementarity relationships between products and across vertical channels relate 
to the exercise of market power. It also provides a structural representation of pricing with an 
explicit characterization of the role of market power. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) has 
been commonly used to assess horizontal market concentration (e.g., Whinston 2006). Our 
analysis relies on a vertical HHI (termed VHHI) that captures how market concentration and 
vertical organization relate to the pricing of differentiated products.  
The approach is then applied to an analysis of pricing in the U.S. cottonseed industry. 
The cottonseed market makes an excellent case study for at least three reasons. First, the 
cottonseed industry is highly concentrated and now dominated by a few large seed firms 
(Fernandez-Cornejo 2004). Second, the recent biotechnology revolution has stimulated the 
                                                 
2 For example, Azzam (1997) tested for efficiency gains and market power losses in the 
horizontal market for processed beef.  He found that efficiency gains outweighed the market 
power welfare losses.  More recently, Hortaçsu and Syverson (2007) found no evidence that 
vertical organization negatively impacted prices in the U.S. cement-concrete market. Gugler and 
Siebert (2007) studied the impacts of mergers and joint research ventures for the computer 
microcomponents and memory markets.  Their counterfactual experiments found that research 
joint ventures achieve efficiency gains similar to what mergers could do.  
  3development of patented genetic material by biotech firms, which has been used as upstream 
inputs in the downstream cottonseed production industry. This has created new opportunities 
for product differentiation and price discrimination under alternative vertical structures. Third, 
the role of both horizontal and vertical organization in biotechnology and seed markets has 
been of interest to economists and anti-trust policy makers because of the surge of mergers 
and acquisitions in these industries since the 1990s  (e.g., Graff et al. 2003; Fernandez-
Cornejo 2004; Moss 2009; Shi 2009).  Graff et al. (2003) suggest that vertical integration may 
be motivated by efficiency gains obtained from the complementarity of assets in agricultural 
biotechnology and seed industries. Others have raised questions about whether market power 
may have adverse effects on efficiency (e.g., Fernandez-Cornejo 2004). These concerns have 
motivated the involvement of the U.S. DOJ in a recent vertical merger in the cottonseed 
industry: the acquisition of Delta and Pine Land Company (DPL), the largest cottonseed 
company in the US, by Monsanto, one of the largest agricultural biotech companies in the 
world.
3  
Our econometric analysis evaluates the pricing of cottonseeds in the major cotton-
producing region of Texas and Oklahoma. We develop a structural estimation of a pricing 
equation in the first part of the paper. The model motivates the use of the VHHI as a measure of 
concentration in both horizontal and vertical markets. We consider the case of multi-seed-
product markets, including “stacked seeds” where patented biotech traits are bundled in given 
cottonseed types. We also consider two vertical structures: vertical integration and licensing.  
                                                 
3 In 2007, the DOJ gave approval to the merger under the condition that Monsanto divests of 
some of its assets in markets where it is a dominant player. See the DOJ website: 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/May/07_at_391.html.  
 
  4Our empirical analysis covers the period 2002-2007.  It documents that the market share 
of conventionally bred cottonseeds has been declining. The market for biotech seeds (i.e., seeds 
with patented traits) shows patterns that vary for different firms and different seed types. Bayer 
CropScience, also a large agricultural biotech company, entered the cottonseed market in 1999, 
and has exhibited a major growth in sales since 2002 (Shi 2009).  Monsanto purchased a major 
seed-breeding firm in 2005 and expanded on its vertical integration afterwards. Our econometric 
analysis provides useful information on the implications of these trends and their linkages with 
the pricing of cottonseed.  
Our investigation examines the differential pricing of conventional seeds and of patented 
biotech seeds. The biotech cottonseeds include two types of patented traits: herbicide tolerance 
(HT) and insect resistance (IR), either present independently or stacked (when HT and IR traits 
are bundled together). Our empirical analysis of stacked seeds finds strong evidence against 
component pricing and in favor of sub-additive pricing of patented traits. We also document how 
changing market concentration and vertical organization relate to cottonseed prices. We find that 
vertical organization affects pricing and the exercise of market power. Our analysis documents 
that seeds sold under vertical integration are priced higher than those sold through licensing. 
While we find that increased market concentration is associated with a higher price in the 
corresponding market, our results also show evidence of cross-market complementarities that 
mitigate the price-enhancement associated with market power. By identifying the role of cross-
market concentrations, this stresses the need to conduct the analysis of market structure in a 
multi-market context.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The conceptual model is presented in 
section 2. The data and empirical specification are discussed in section 3. Section 4 reports the 
  5econometric results. Section 5 discusses the economic implications of our findings. Finally, 
section 6 presents conclusions.     
  
2.  Conceptual Approach 
Consider markets serviced by N firms producing up to Q outputs, N = {1, …, N} 
denoting the set of firms and Q = {1, …, Q} being the set of outputs.  The production and 
marketing of these outputs engages an upstream technology that can involve V alternative 
vertical organizations. Let V ≡ {1, …, V} denote the set of possible vertical structures (including 
vertical contract and vertical integration).  The output vector produced by the n-th firm is 
denoted by  11 ( ,..., ,..., }
nn n n Q V
mQ V yyy y τ + = ℜ
n
m y τ ∈ ,   being the quantity of the m-th good produced by 
the n-th firm under the τ-th vertical structure, m ∈ Q, n ∈ N, τ ∈ V.  
Each firm maximizes profit across marketing channels. With the potential for implicit or 
explicit contracts between upstream technology provider and the downstream firm, we examine 
how the exercise of market power in both horizontal and vertical markets is associated with 
pricing in the end-use market.  We allow for vertical as well as horizontal product differentiation. 
This takes place through quality choices, labels, brands, advertising, etc. Vertical product 
differentiation means that pricing can vary across vertical structures.  
The price-dependent demand for the m-th output under the τ-th vertical structure is 
denoted by  . Then, profit for the n-th firm is: ∑ ∑ ∈N n
n
m y p ) ( τ m∈Q ∑τ∈V [pmτ(∑n∈N y






n) represents the n-th firm’s total costs of production and marketing. Assuming 
Cournot behavior, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the n-th firm for the m-th output in the τ-th 
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Equation (1c) is the complementary slackness condition which applies whether the m-th 
output is produced by the n-th firm in the τ-th vertical structure (
n
m y τ  > 0) or not (
n
m y τ  = 0). As 
such, (1c) holds even if the firm does not produce the full array of differentiated products. This 
allows for foreclosure, where the strategy of one firm may preclude other firms from producing a 
particular product. And (1c) applies for any vertical organization selected by the firm.      
Assume that the cost function of the n-th firm takes the quadratic form Cn(y
n) = Fn(Sn) + 
∑m∈Q ∑τ∈V cmτ y   + ½ ∑
n




mτ n(Sn) denotes fixed cost, ckk,uu ≥ 0 
and ckm,uτ  = cmk,τu. Fixed cost Fn(Sn) satisfies Fn(∅) = 0, where Sn = {(m,τ): 
n
m y τ  > 0, m∈Q, τ∈V} 
is the set of positive outputs. While the variable cost enters explicitly in equations (1a)-(1c), the 
fixed cost Fn(Sn) can also play a role. Indeed, fixed costs must be recovered to guarantee the 
sustainability of each firm. This typically implies a departure from marginal cost pricing. Fixed 
costs can come from two potential sources: the upstream industry (e.g., R&D investment); and 
the downstream industry (e.g., fixed cost in establishing a vertical organization). Both fixed costs 
and variable costs are relevant in evaluating the efficiency of a firm. For example, as shown by 
Baumol et al. (1982), both fixed costs and variable costs can contribute to economies of scope. 
And economies of scope can generate efficiency gains by reducing the cost of production for 
multi-output firms. 
Let the price-dependent demand for the kth product under the u-th vertical structure be 
pku = bku + ∑m∈Q ∑τ∈V ∑n∈N αkm,uτ y , with α
n
mτ kk,uu < 0. Denote by 
n
m nN Y m y τ τ ∈ =∑  the aggregate 







τ τ =  
  7∈ [0, 1] as the corresponding market share for the n-th firm. Dividing equation (1c) by Ymτ and 
summing across all n, we obtain the following result.  
Proposition 1: The pricing of the m-th product under the τ-th vertical structure satisfies   
pmτ = cmτ  + ∑k∈Q ∑u∈V [ckm,uτ - αkm,uτ] ⋅ Hkm,uτ ⋅ Yku,   (2) 
where  






ku s s τ
with m, k ∈ Q and u, τ ∈ V.  
 
Following Shi and Chavas (2009), the term defined in (3), Hkm,uτ, is called the vertical 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index, or VHHI.  Note that Hkm,uτ ∈ [0, 1], and that Hkm,uτ → 0 under 
prefect competition when there are many active firms in all markets. It follows that the part of 
the price equation (2) that includes the Hkm,uτ’s reflect departures from competitive conditions 
and the exercise of market power. It will be useful to identify this part explicitly by defining   
∑∑ ∈∈ ⋅ ⋅ − =
QV k ku u km u u km u km m Y H c M τ τ τ τ α , , , ] [ .   (4) 
Given that Hkm,uτ → 0 under perfect competition and using (2), it follows that Mmτ in (4) 
provides a measure of the market power component of prices. With Hkm,uτ ∈ [0, 1], note that 
Hkm,uτ increases with market concentration; and it reaches its maximum (Hkm,uτ = 1) under 
monopoly. As such, Mmτ in (4) provides a convenient measure of how market concentration is 
associated with pricing. Equations (2)-(4) are central to our empirical analysis below. Note that 
the magnitude of Mmτ also depends on Yku, reflecting the market size of product k under the u-th 
vertical structure. As market size is affected by entry/exit, this means that the evaluation of 
  8market power has to consider both market concentration effects and market size effects. We will 
discuss these effects in more details in section 5.  
Public policy regarding imperfect competition (e.g. merger policy, price fixing, cartels, 
abuse of dominance) remains principally concerned with the potential negative impacts of 
concentration on competition (Coates and Ulrich 2009). The most common measure of market 
concentration is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) defined as the sum of squared market 
shares across all firms in the relevant market.
4 When there is a single product (Q = 1) and a 
single vertical structure (V = 1), note that our VHHI measure H11,11 is just the classical HHI. 
Given c11,11 ≥ 0 and α11,11 < 0, equations (2)-(4) indicate that an increase in the HHI, H11,11, 
(simulating an increase in market power) is associated with an increase in M11, and thus an 
increase in price p11.  
Equations (2)-(4) extend the HHI to a multi-product context (when Q > 1) and under 
various vertical structures (when V > 1). When k ≠ m and u = τ, it shows that a rise in the “cross-
market” VHHI, Hkm,ττ, would be associated with an increase (a decrease) in Mmτ if [ckm,ττ - αkm,ττ] 
> 0 (< 0). This indicates that, under vertical structure τ, the sign of [ckm,ττ - αkm,ττ] affects the 









∂  and following Hicks 
(1939), note that αkm,ττ < 0 (> 0) when products k and m are substitutes (complements) on the 
demand side, corresponding to situations where increasing   tends to decrease (increase) the 













∂∂  > 0 (< 0) when products k and m are substitutes 
(complements) on the supply side, corresponding to situations where increasing   tends to 
n
m y τ
                                                 
4 As a rule of thumb, HHI > 0.18 has been considered as a threshold that raises concerns about the degree 
of competition (Whinston 2006). As Coates and Ulrich (2009) report, the decision to challenge mergers 
by  the U.S. Federal Trade Commission typically focused on HHIs mainly in the 0.20 to 0.50 range. 




km,ττ  < 0) contributes to economies of scope (Baumol et al. 1982, p. 75), where multi-
output production reduces costs. It follows that the term [ckm,ττ - αkm,ττ] would be positive 
(negative) when   and   behave as substitutes (complements) on the supply side and 






km,ττ} on Mmτ depend on the nature of substitution or complementarity among outputs (through 
the terms [ckm,ττ - αkm,ττ]). It means that a rise in Hkm,ττ would be associated with an increase (a 
decrease) in Mmτ when ykτ and ymτ are substitutes (complements).  
Of special interest here are the effects of vertical structures on pricing. Consider the case 
where u ≠ τ and k = m. Then, equations (3) and (4) also show how vertical organization 
influences prices. They show that a rise in VHHI Hmm,uτ would be associated with an increase (a 
decrease) in Mmτ if [cmm,uτ - αmm,uτ] > 0 (< 0).  This indicates that, for a given product m, the sign 
of [cmm,uτ - αmm,uτ] affects the nature  of the departure from competitive pricing. As just discussed, 
we expect [cmm,uτ - αmm,uτ] > 0 (< 0) when product m exhibits substitution (complementarity) 
across vertical structures u and τ. Thus the terms Hmm,uτ’s in equations (3)-(4) show how the 
nature of substitution or complementarity across vertical structures influences the correlation of 
market concentration and prices. It indicates that a rise in Hmm,uτ would be associated with an 
increase (a decrease) in Mmτ when ymu and ymτ are substitutes (complements).  
Are there conditions under which vertical structures would have no effect on pricing? As 
shown by Shi and Chavas (2009), this would occur if products were perfect substitutes across 
vertical structures on the demand side as well as on the supply side. Then, pmτ = pm, as the law of 
one price applies to perfect substitutes. Perfect substitution on the supply side corresponds to 
  10situations in which the cost function takes the form Cn(y




n y y C , 
implying that cmτ  = cm and ckm,uτ  = ckm for k, m ∈ Q and u, τ ∈ V. Similarly, perfect substitution 






∂  ≡ αkm,uτ  = αkm for k, m ∈ Q and all u, 
τ ∈ V. These are testable restrictions that will be investigated in our empirical analysis below.  
What happens to equation (4) under perfect substitution across vertical markets? Let Ym = 





τ   and 
summing over τ gives   
∑ ∈ ⋅ ⋅ − =
Q k k km km km m Y H c M ] [ α ,   (4’) 
where Hkm ≡  , S
n











∈ ∑ V   is the n-th firm market share for the k-th product. Mm in 
(4’) gives the market power component of the price of the m-th product (pm). In this case, note 
that Hkm is a concentration measure across the k-th and m-th horizontal markets, and it satisfies 









τ  , i.e. it is a weighted average of our VHHI’s Hkm,uτ.  
Taking the analysis one step further, what would happen to equation (4) or (4’) if 
horizontal products were also perfect substitutes? Following the same arguments, this would 
imply that ckm  = c and αkm = α, and that the law of one price would apply across horizontal 
markets: pm = p. Then, letting Y= ∑m∈Q Ym, multiplying the right-hand side of (4’) by 
m Y
Y  and 
summing over m∈Q would give   
Y H c M ⋅ ⋅ − = ] [ α ,   (4”) 
where H ≡  , w  =  ∑ ∈ ⋅
N n





∈∈ ∑∑ QV is the n-th firm’s overall market share. M in (4”) 
gives the market power component of price p when all products are perfect substitutes. In this 
  11case, note that H is the classical HHI providing a measure of overall market concentration. And it 
satisfies H = ∑m∈Q ∑k∈Q Hkm ⋅ 
k Y
Y   ⋅ 
m Y
Y  = ∑m∈Q ∑k∈Q ∑u∈V ∑τ∈V Hkm,uτ ⋅ 
ku Y
Y  ⋅ 
m Y
Y
τ , i.e. it is a 
weighted average of our VHHI’s Hkm,uτ. This makes it clear that when all products are perfect 
substitutes, our approach reduces to a single market analysis and to the HHI approach commonly 
found in the literature (e.g., Whinston 2006). It also shows how our VHHI generalizes previous 
analyses in the presence of product differentiation (when products are not perfect substitutes). It 
identifies the roles of substitution/complementarity among products and their effects on pricing 
under imperfect competition. Importantly, our generalization allows for product differentiation 
both in horizontal and vertical organizations.   
Equation (3) indicates that the VHHI’s Hkm,uτ provide the relevant information to assess 
the role of market power in horizontal and vertical markets. It can provide a basis for empirical 
investigations of the pricing of differentiated products in a vertical sector under imperfect 
competition. This is illustrated next in an application to the U.S. cottonseed industry. In this 
application, the upstream firm develops the seed production technology (i.e., a biotech firm 
developing patented genetic material that can be inserted in the basic seed), and the downstream 
firm uses the upstream technology to produce and sell the biotech seeds to farmers.  
 
3.  Data and Model Specification 
Our analysis uses a data set providing detailed information on the U.S. cottonseed market. 
The data were collected by dmrkynetec [hereafter dmrk]. The dmrk data come from a stratified 
sample of U.S. cotton farmers surveyed annually in 2002-2007.
5 The survey provides farm-level 
information on seed purchases, acreage, seed types, technology fees, and seed prices. It was 
                                                 
5  The survey is stratified to over-sample producers with large acreage.  
  12collected using computer assisted telephone interviews. Farmers typically buy their seeds locally, 
and seeds are usually developed for different agro-climatic conditions in different regions. We 
define the “local market” at the Crop Reporting Districts (CRD)
6 level. Our analysis focuses on 
the High Plains of Texas and Oklahoma, a major cotton-producing region.  
Using equation (3), we introduce a price equation with binary terms that partitions 
cottonseed transactions based on different genetic characteristics and different vertical structures.  
Equation (3) reflects a structural approach that evaluates the components of multiproduct pricing 
under imperfect competition and modal vertical structures.  We focus our attention on the case of 
two vertical structures: vertical integration (v) and licensing (ℓ). Let Dτ ∈ {0, 1} be dummy 
variables for vertical structures, satisfying Dτ = 1 for the τ-th vertical structure and Dτ = 0 
otherwise, τ ∈ V = {ℓ, v}. We consider 4 seed types (Q = 4): conventional (T1 = 1), single trait 
herbicide tolerance HT (T2 = 1), single trait insect resistance IR (T3 = 1), and bundling/stacking 
of HT and IR (T4 = 1). Since the conventional seeds do not include any patented biotech trait, we 
assume the vertical structure for the conventional seed being not integrated (i.e. only ℓ). 
Note that our analysis allows costs (both fixed and variable) to vary across vertical 
structures. Under vertical integration v, the R&D fixed cost can be recovered directly by the 
integrated firm but the firm may possibly incur additional transaction costs associated with 
integration. Under licensing ℓ, a royalty fee is paid by the seed company (licensee) to the biotech 
firm (licensor). The fee raises the marginal cost of the licensee and should help the licensor 
recover its R&D investment. In general, the two vertical structures can vary both in terms of 
efficiency and in terms of exercise of market power. Also, both assessments can be affected by 
the multi-product nature of the market. For example, the presence and magnitude of economies 
                                                 
6  A crop-reporting district (CRD) is defined by the US Department of Agriculture to reflect local agro-
climatic conditions.  In general, a CRD is larger than a county but smaller than a state.   
  13of scope can vary between vertical structures. And as discussed above, the presence of 
complementarity (or substitution) across vertically differentiated products can reduce (enhance) 
the firms’ ability to exercise market power. The empirical analysis presented below will shed 
some useful lights on these issues.  
We begin with a standard model of hedonic pricing given by:   
pmτ =  mm m m TD τ ττ τ β δ ++ + φX ε , (5a) 
where the price for a seed of type m sold under the τ-th vertical structure is hypothesized to vary 
with its characteristics (e.g., following Rosen 1974), X is a vector of covariates that capture 
various aspects of the market for seeds and εmτ is an error term with mean zero and finite 
variance.  The middle term on the righthand side of equation (5a) contains two binary variables 
that control for the seed type ( ) and the vertical structure ( m T Dτ ).  As shown in equations (2)-(4), 
we introduce market power effects in (5a) by specifying 
4
0, , 1 mk m u k m ku HY T D u k u m τ ττ ββ β
=∈ =+ ∑∑ V τ ,   (5b) 
where βkm,uτ ≡ [ckm,uτ - αkm,uτ], Hkm,uτ = 
nn
ku m n ss τ ∈ ∑ N  is the VHHI defined in (3), and  is the 
market share of the n-th firm in the market for the k-th seed type under the u-th vertical structure. 
When k ≠ m and u ≠ τ, H
n
ku s
km,uτ provides a measure of cross-market concentration across product 
types k and m and across vertical structures u and τ. Also, following (4), it follows from (5b) that 
the market power component in (5a)-(5b) is given by 
Mmτ = ∑k∈Q ∑u∈V βkm,uτ  Hkm,uτ  Yku  Tm Dτ , (6) 
where Mmτ → 0 under perfect competition. Equation (6) provides a convenient measure of the 
effect of imperfect competition under various vertical structures.     
 To illustrate, the equation estimated for the price of the conventional seed (T1 = 1) is  
  14p1ℓ = 
4
01 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 1 1 1() kk kk v k v k v k HY HY T D T D 1 β ββ δ
= ++ + + ∑ φX ll ll l l l l l l l ε +
3
, 
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0 3 ,3 , 3 ,3 , 3 3 3 1() kvkv k k v vk v v k v v v v v k HY HY T D T D β ββ δ
= ++ + + ∑ φX ll l ε + .  
Similar equations can be written for the single trait HT seed (T2 = 1) and for the 
bundled/stacked seed (T4 = 1). The number of observations of vertically integrated IR seeds and 
stacked seeds (T3v and T4v) is not sufficient in our sample for valid construction of the VHHI’s. 
Therefore, in the example given above for the IR seed market, all of the  3, kv τ β terms are set equal 
to zero.  Similar terms for the stacked seed market are also set to zero.  The vertical components 
of the characteristic effects for the IR and stacked seed markets are estimated (i.e. the  3v δ and 
4v δ terms).   
Each CRD is presumed to represent the relevant market area for each transaction; thus, 
all H terms are calculated at that level. Each purchase observation is at the farm- level. The price 
p in equation (5a) is the net seed price paid by farmers (in $ per bag
7).  Table 1 contains 
summary statistics of the data used in the analysis.  
The relevant covariates X include location, year dummies, each farm’s total cotton 
acreage, and binary terms covering the range of how each purchase was sourced. The location 
                                                 
7  In the cottonseed market, farmers used to pay the price in two parts: the “seed price” and then the 
“technology fee” if the seed were a biotech seed with patented genetic trait technology. More recently, 
biotech companies changed the pricing scheme, so that farmers only pay a single price that contains 
both the “seed price” and the “technology fee”.  To facilitate the analysis of pricing over the study 
period, we normalize the two part seed pricing in earlier years into the same single pricing format in 
recent years, i.e., $ per bag, with 250,000 seeds per bag. 
  15variables are defined as state dummies, capturing spatial heterogeneity in cropping systems and 
state institutions. Since the CRDs in the two states in our sample are adjacent to each other, we 
do not expect weather patterns and yield potential to differ substantially across the state border. 
The year dummies are included to capture the advances in genetic technology, and possible event 
effects throughout the years of the study.  Farm acreage captures possible price discrimination 
effects related to farm size. Note that farmers may choose different sources for different seed 
varieties. Including source of purchase as an explanatory variable in (5a) captures possible price 
discrimination schemes affecting the seed price paid by farmers.  
We address two critical econometric issues.  First, the potential for endogeneity of the 
VHHIs is a concern for our econometric estimation of equation (5a)-(5b).
8  Firms’ strategies may 
affect seed pricing, quantity sold (Y), and hence market concentrations (as measured by H) 
jointly. When some of the determinants of these strategies are unobserved by the econometrician, 
the interaction terms, H⋅Y, may be correlated with the error term in equation (5a).  This would 
lead to biased and inconsistent parameter estimates. We tested for possible endogeneity of the 
H’s and Y’s using a C statistic calculated as the difference of two Sargan statistics (Hayashi 2000, 
p. 232). The test is robust to violations of the conditional homoscedasticity assumption (Hayashi 
2000, p. 232).
9 In our case, the C statistic is 94.60 (with p-value less than 0.01), showing strong 
statistical evidence against the null hypothesis of exogeneity. 
To correct for potential endogeneity bias, we employ an instrumental variable (IV) 
estimation method.  The instruments include the product of the lagged values of H and the 
lagged values of Y, and the lagged values of Y alone.  It is critical that our choice of instruments 
                                                 
8 The endogeneity of our VHHI terms is at the heart of the foundational points emerging from the 
Chicago School.  Indeed, if increased concentration evolves from the incentives associated with the 
drive toward efficiency, then price and market structure are jointly determined.    
 
9 Under conditional homoskedasticity, the C statistic is numerically equivalent to a Hausman test statistic. 
  16satisfy the orthogonality conditions. The Hansen J statistic was used to test if the instruments are 
uncorrelated with the disturbance.  Our estimated J-statistic was statistically insignificant (with 
p-value of 0.22), suggesting that we have good candidates for instruments. Good instruments 
should also provide information identifying the parameters: they should not be “weak 
instruments”. In the presence of heteroscedastic errors, we used the Bound et al. (1995) measures 
and the Shea (1997) partial
2 R statistic to test for weak instruments. Following Staiger and Stock 
(1997), the test results indicated no statistical evidence that our instruments are weak. Finally, 
The Kleibergen-Paap weak instrument test was conducted (Kleibergen and Paap 2006),
10 
yielding a test statistic of 13.28. Using the critical values presented in Stock and Yogo (2005), 
this indicated again that our analysis does not suffer from weak instruments.   
A second econometric concern involved the potential for heteroskedastic disturbances in 
the error term in (5a). A Pagan-Hall test
11 of the IV model found strong evidence against 
homoscedasticity.  Unobserved farm-specific factors such as variations in pest populations, soil 
quality, rainfall, temperature, etc. are likely sources of the heteroscedasticity.  While it is 
reasonable to anticipate these factors to differ across farms, they are not likely to be much 
different within a farm. This suggests that the variance of the error term in (5a) would exhibit 
heteroscedasticity, with clustering at the farm level. 
 
                                                 
10 Note that, in contrast with the Cragg-Donald test, the Kleibergen-Paap test remains a valid test for weak 
instruments in the presence of heteroscedasticity.   
11 Compared to the conventional Breusch-Pagan test, the Pagan-Hall test is a more general test for 
heteroscedasticity in an IV regression: it remains valid in the presence of heteroscedasticity (Pagan and 
Hall 1983). 
  174.  Econometric Results 
Equations (5a)-(5b) were estimated using the dmrk farm-level data for Texas and 
Oklahoma. The model was estimated using two-stage least squares (2SLS) with 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors under clustering. Because the demand for seed is a 
derived demand from farmers’ profit maximization, the willingness to pay can be interpreted in 
terms of marginal profit and the demand slope is the second derivative of farmers’ profit. By 


















∂  = αmk,uτ, 
cmk,uτ = ckm,τu, and βmk,uτ = [cmk,uτ - αmk,uτ], the following tests of such restrictions are evaluated:  
(I) H0: βmk,ℓℓ = βkm,ℓℓ, 
(II) H0: βmk,ℓv = βkm,vℓ, 
where the β’s are the coefficients of the corresponding VHHI’s. Using a Wald test, we failed to 
reject the null hypotheses in I and II. As a result, we imposed the symmetry restrictions in the 
analysis presented below.  
Table 2 reports the regression results. For comparison purpose, the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimation results with robust standard errors are also reported. The OLS estimation 
results differ from the 2SLS results substantially, suggesting that our use of IV estimation is 
needed to deal with endogeneity bias. The analysis presented below relies on the IV/2SLS 
estimates.  
We first discuss the estimates of how prices vary across seed types and vertical structures, 
followed by a discussion of the estimated effects of market power. Compared to conventional 
seeds, the results show that all biotech seeds receive a price premium that varies with the vertical 
structure. The coefficients of the TiDv’s (i
th seed under integrated vertical structure) and TiDℓ’s 
(i
th seed under licensing vertical structure), i = 2, 3, 4, are each positive and statistically 
  18significant. Ranging from $75.12 to $162.88, they show evidence of significant premiums for 
these biotech traits. Additionally, the stacked biotech seeds are sold at a higher price than the 
single trait biotech seeds. However, the additional premium is lower than the premium of that 
relevant trait in the single trait system (as further discussed in section 5).  
The model incorporates market share information about each seed type in different 
vertical structures using the VHHIs. All of the coefficients on the own VHHI terms, i.e. the 
classical HHI terms (H11,ℓℓ, H22,vv, H22,ℓℓ, H33,ℓℓ,  and H44,ℓℓ) are positive and all but one (H22,ℓℓ) is 
statistically different from zero. These findings reveal that direct competition of similar types of 
seeds (i.e. conventional, HT-vertically integrated, IR-licensed, and stacked HT/IR-licensed) 
matters a great deal in the prices that farmers pay. The positive sign for H11,ℓℓ, confirms that, for 
conventional seeds, higher market concentration is associated with higher prices.  Similar 
findings are present for vertically integrated herbicide tolerance (H22,vv), licensed insect resistant 
(H33,ℓℓ)  and licensed stacked traited (H44,ℓℓ) seeds.  Note that we broke out the traditional HHIs in 
the HT market into two modes of vertical delivery: integration (v) and licensing (ℓ). The 
traditional HHI for the integrated HT market was significant (but not so for the licensed HT 
market).  
We have argued in section 2 that the effects of VHHI Hkm,uτ, k ≠ m, and/or u ≠ τ  depend 
on the substitutability/complementarity relationship between the type-k seed in u-th market 
structure and the type-m seed in τ -th market structure. We expect that an increase in the VHHI 
will be associated with a rise (decrease) in the price if the two types of seed are substitutes 
(complements). For the four cross-market VHHIs associated with the conventional seed price 
(H21,ℓℓ, H21,vℓ, H31,ℓℓ, H41,ℓℓ), all are negative and all but H21,ℓℓ,  is statistically different from zero. 
These results provide evidence that there exist strong complementarity relationships between 
conventional seeds and other types of seeds.  
  19Of the three cross VHHIs that may be associated with the pricing of HT biotech seed in 
the vertically integrated structure (H12,ℓv, , H32,ℓv, H42,ℓv), all have statistically significant 
coefficients. The coefficient on H32,ℓv is positive and the remaining two (H12,ℓv, H42,ℓv) are 
negative. Of the three cross VHHIs that may be relevant to the pricing of HT biotech seed in the 
licensing structure (H12,ℓℓ, H32,ℓℓ, H42,ℓℓ),  only the coefficient on H42,ℓℓ is statistically significant. 
For the HT market, we also capture the cross effects derived from the two vertical structures: 
vertically integrated HT seed market’s impacts on the HT licensed market (H22,ℓv) and vice versa 
(H22, vℓ).  Both of these terms are positive and statistically significant, but the magnitude of each 
effect is quite different. The impact of vertical integration on the licensed market is stronger than 
the impact of licensing on the vertically integrated market.  
Under symmetry restrictions, several of the coefficients of VHHIs involving the licensed 
IR seed and the stacked HT/IR seeds have been discussed.  The effect of the VHHI between the 
licensed IR1 seed and the licensed stacking seed (H43,ℓℓ) is negative and statistically significant. 
As discussed above, this implies a complementary relationship.   
One focus of our study is the relationship between vertical organization and pricing. Our 
analysis allows us to evaluate whether seed pricing varies in a similar way with market 
concentration under alternative vertical structures. This corresponds to the following set of 
hypotheses:  
(III) H0: βkm,ℓℓ = βkm,vℓ = βkm,vv = βkm,ℓv.  
We conducted Wald tests for the null hypotheses H21,ℓℓ = H21,vℓ, H42,ℓℓ = H42,ℓv, and H23,ℓℓ 
= H23,vℓ. All are rejected at the 5% significance level. This provides strong statistical evidence 
that vertical organization matters. It indicates that vertical structures interact with the exercise of 
market power as related to pricing. Further implications of the estimated model are evaluated 
below (see section 5) with a focus on changing market conditions.  
  20Table 2 also shows how prices vary over time. The year dummy variables show dramatic 
effects during our study period: in 2004, seed price is $18.29 per bag higher than in 2003, and 
the price in 2005 is $25.42 per bag less than in 2003. Prices in 2006 increased from the previous 
year to $58.38 per bag higher than in 2003, and increased further in 2007 to $76.22 per bag 
higher than in 2003. Given that the mean price is about $122.80 per bag, this gives an annual rate 
of change between 15% and 70%.  Our state dummy variable was insignificant, indicating that 
prices are not different between Texas and Oklahoma. Table 2 also indicates that the method of 
purchase does not affect prices. Finally, it shows that the farm size effect is not statistically 
significant.      
 
5.  Implications  
While the results in Table 2 reveal the factors affecting the price of cottonseeds, the 
effects of changes in market conditions are complex in a multi-market context. In this section, 
we explore the implications of our econometric estimates by simulating how alternative market 
scenarios are associated with changes in cottonseed pricing. We focus our attention on two sets 
of scenarios: 1) the impact of stacking/bundling of biotech traits; and 2) the impacts of market 
size and changing market structures. To support hypothesis testing across scenarios, all simulated 
prices are bootstrapped.  
5.1. Effects of Stacking/Bundling in Different Markets 
The implications of stacking for cottonseed prices are presented in Table 3. Evaluated at 
market conditions in Texas in 2006, Table 3 shows that the prices for biotech seeds (T2, T3 and T4) 
are significantly higher than the price of conventional seeds (T1). This is true under both 
licensing and vertical integration. The price premium paid for biotech traits (compared to 
conventional seeds) implies  that biotech seeds provide farm productivity gains (by increasing 
  21yield and reducing labor or pesticide inputs). It also indicates that these gains generate farm 
profits that are captured in part by biotech and seed firms.  
Table 3 shows that the price of stacked seeds (T4) is higher than the price of single-trait 
seeds (T2 or T3). It also reports stacking effects by comparing the price premium of stacked seeds 
(T4) versus the sum of the premium for single-trait seeds (T2 and T3).  The results show that the 
premium for stacked seeds is less than the sum of the premium for single trait seeds. The 
difference is statistically significant. This infers a rejection of component pricing for biotech 
seeds (where seeds would be valued as the sum of their component values) in favor of sub-
additive pricing (where stacked/bundled seeds are sold at a discount compared to the pricing of 
the individual components). To the extent that both HT and IR technology increases productivity, 
this provides an incentive for farmers to purchase stacked/bundled seeds (as compared to single-
trait biotech seeds). The discounting of bundled traits may reflect complementarities and 
economies of scope in the production and marketing of biotech traits. In this case, the joint 
production and marketing of biotech traits may contribute to lowering cost, which may be shared 
in part with farmers in the form of price discounts offered by seed companies.  
Table 3 also shows how vertical structures affect pricing. It reports that seed prices are 
lower under licensing than under vertical integration. The difference is statistically significant for 
HT (T2) and stacked seeds (T4). This indicates that vertical integration contributes to increasing 
the price paid by farmers.
12 Finally, Table 3 shows that stacking effects do not vary 
systematically across vertical structures: sub-additivity in pricing applies under both vertical 
integration and licensing, and the associated price discounts are not statistically different 
between the two vertical organizations.  
                                                 
12 Note that such effects could be due to quality differences between seeds sold under vertical integration 
versus licensing. However, data on productivity would be needed to address this issue.  
  225.2. Effects of Changing Market Size and Market Structures 
The effects of changing market conditions are examined by evaluating two effects: the 
impact of changing market size (as measured by the Y); and the impact of changing market 
concentrations (as measured by the H). For simplicity, we focus our attention on observed 
changes taking place between 2002 and 2006.   
  The effects of changing market sizes between 2002 and 2006 are reported in the top panel 
in Table 4, holding the H’s (HHIs and VHHIs) at their 2002 level. From 2002 to 2006, both the 
conventional seed and HT licensed seed have exhibited a declining market share, while the 
shares in integrated HT, IR and stacked seeds have increased. The results show that, ceteris 
paribus, changing market sizes implies that the price of conventional seed decreases by $12.06 
(significant at the 1% level), the price of licensed HT seed decreases by $16.91 (significant at the 
5% level), the price of the licensed stacking seed increases by $27.83 (significant at the 10% 
level) and the price of vertically integrated HT seed increases by $23.56 (significant at the 10% 
level).  This documents significant correlation of market sizes with seed pricing.  
  The effects of changing own market concentrations (as measured by the own VHHIs) 
between 2002 and 2006 are reported in the middle panel in Table 4, holding the Ys and cross 
VHHIs at their 2002 level. From 2002 to 2006, all own VHHIs (H11ℓℓ, H22ℓℓ, H22vv, H44ℓℓ) 
decreased, with the exception of H33ℓℓ, which increased. These own-market concentration 
measures indicate a trend toward greater competition between 2002 and 2006 in the Texas 
cottonseed market. One primary source of the increased competition was the successful entry by 
Bayer CropScience through its FiberMax flagship brand. The results show that, ceteris paribus, 
changing own-market concentrations implied that, except for the licensed IR seeds, all price 
changes are negative. This is consistent with the patterns of changes in the own VHHIs. The 
  23price reduction is $1.78 for the conventional seed, $0.56 for the integrated HT seed, and $3.96 
for the stacked seed (all significant at the 1% level).  
  Finally, the effects of changing all market concentrations (as measured by both the own 
VHHIs and the cross VHHIs) between 2002 and 2006 are reported in the bottom panel in Table 
4, holding the Ys at their 2002 level. During these four years, eight cross VHHIs decreased 
(H12ℓℓ, H14ℓℓ, H24ℓℓ, H24vℓ, H13ℓℓ, H23ℓℓ, H23vℓ, H32ℓℓ), while two cross VHHIs increased (H12ℓv and 
H22ℓv). There are several possible reasons for these structural changes taking place. Certainly, the 
emergence of Bayer CropScience and possibly the reactions by other firms to this entrant has had 
an effect. The results show that, ceteris paribus, recent changes in market concentrations implied 
some increases in all prices. Contrasting the results in the middle panel and the bottom panel in 
Table 4 illustrates the important role played by cross-market concentration. Generally declining 
levels of own VHHIs are associated to three statistically significant price declines. However, by 
including the cross VHHIs in the simulation, two of the prices are now statistically significant 
and higher in 2006 compared to 2002: the price of vertically integrated HT seed (+$73.30, 
significant at the 1% level) and that of the licensed stacked seeds (+$16.82, significant at the 1% 
level). These results underscore the fact that complementarity effects identified in our 
econometric analysis impact the linkages between market concentrations and pricing. This also 
stresses the importance of evaluating changing market structures in a multi-product framework.   
5.3. Decomposition of the market power effect 
Equations (4) and (6) indicate that the market power component of pricing (as measured 
by M) involves two multiplicative components: a component associated with market 
concentration (called the H effect), and a component associated with market size (called the Y 
effect).  When market conditions change due to firm entry or merger activities, the market power 
component M will be affected by both H and Y. This raises the question: how much of the total 
  24change in M is due to the market concentration effect H, and how much is due to the market size 
effect Y?  To answer this question, we propose to decompose the total market power component  
M (H ⋅ Y) into two parts. Consider a change from (H0, Y0) to (H1, Y1). The associated change in M 
is ΔM(H ⋅ Y) = M(H1 ⋅ Y1) - M(H0 ⋅ Y0). This can be decomposed as follows:   
ΔM(H ⋅ Y) = {M(H1 ⋅ Y0) - M(H0 ⋅ Y0)} + {M(H1 ⋅ Y1) - M(H1 ⋅ Y0)}  
= {H effect} + {Y effect}.   
The purpose of our next simulation is to evaluate two specific time periods when 
identifiable changes were likely to have affected the market.  The period 2002-2004 includes the 
years that Bayer CropScience significantly gained in market share (as discussed above).  The 
second period, 2005-2006, covers the years when Monsanto became a vertically integrated 
biotech firm after merging with an established seed company (Stoneville).  
  Table 5 shows the estimated market power effect M and its components along with 
associated standard errors for both scenarios. The first scenario (2002-2004) is presented in the 
first two columns of results. Of the five seed types (T1, T2 licensed, T2 integrated, T3 and T4 
licensed) analyzed, the total market power component is negative and significant for 
conventional seed and for vertically integrated HT seed.  Based on the decomposition of H and 
Y, this result is driven mostly by the Y effects. The H effects are all positive but only statistically 
significant for the licensed stacked seed.  However, when combined with the negative Y effects, 
its net effect is not significant. The simulation results show that, in a market experiencing 
dramatic changes in terms of entry/exit, market size has important effects on pricing.    
When market conditions changed from 2005 to 2006, the total change on M is positive 
for the vertically integrated HT biotech seed and the licensed stacked seed (both statistically 
significant), and is negative for the other three markets but only significant in the conventional 
seed case.  When statistically significant, the H effects are all positive. They are the major 
  25driving force for positive change in the total market power component in the integrated HT 
biotech seed market and the licensed stacking seed market. In the conventional seed market, the 
Y effects are negative and dominate the positive H effect, leading to a negative and significant 
overall change in the market power component. The Y effects are not statistically significant in 
all other cases.  
The patterns of decomposition differ between the two scenarios. This indicates how 
pricing behavior can change with market conditions. For example, entry/exit and 
merger/acquisition can affect both market size and multi-market concentrations.  In our 
simulations, the different sign of the two components also suggests the importance of 
complementarity and substitutability across products, with net effects that depend on market 
conditions.   
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has investigated the impact of differentiated products and vertical strategies by 
the biotechnology firms in the U.S. cottonseed market. The approach advances the measurement 
of industry concentration to consider substitution/complementarity relationships among 
differentiated products delivered under different vertical structures. The model is flexible and 
allows for evaluation of the implications of market restructuring.   
Applied to pricing in the U.S. cottonseed market, the econometric analysis provides 
useful information on the implications of product differentiation and vertical organization. It 
evaluates the differential pricing of conventional seeds as well as patented biotech seeds, 
including herbicide tolerance (HT) seeds, insect resistant (IR) seeds, and stacked/bundled seeds. 
The model provides for a considerable flexibility in understanding the pricing of cottonseed with 
different GM traits sold in different vertical structures.  Three major results are reported.  First, 
  26we find that own-market concentration is positively associated with higher prices.  This results 
fits the long-standing interpretation that increasing concentration infers market power to firms 
that in turn raise price.  Second, our estimates show evidence of cross-market complementarities 
that imply lower prices will occur in the presence of increased concentration across different 
seed markets.  These complementary effects are important and suggest that firms may pass on 
efficiency gains (perhaps from scope economies) to farmers in the form of lower prices.  Finally, 
our analysis shows that vertical organization affects pricing. We find that pricing of cottonseed is 
higher under vertical integration than under a licensing arrangement.  
We also performed simulations that measure price changes in response to changes in 
groups of variables.  These simulations provided additional insights on the pricing of cottonseeds 
in ways that capture the complex interactions in the VHHI and market size.  When we focused a 
simulation on only changes to the own VHHI, i.e., the classical HHIs, the results underscored the 
changing price structure in each seed market under different vertical structures. In three seed 
markets (conventional, HT-licensed, and IR-licensed), lower concentration led to price declines.  
However, increased concentration in stacked IR/HT seeds and in vertically integrated HT seeds 
both led to higher prices. A more comprehensive simulation was also conducted for two periods 
(2002-2004) and (2005-2006) and we decomposed the overall change in the market power 
component into two parts:  the market size effect and the market concentration effect. The 
simulations illustrated the joint effects of changes in own and cross-market concentrations along 
with the effects of expanding or contracting markets. The results provide a foundation for a 
better understanding of new entrants and mergers in markets with complex vertical and product 
different. This simulation approach is applicable for pre-merger analysis of industries producing 
differentiated products and exhibiting similar market complexities.  
  27Table 1. Summary statistics.
a,b





Net Price ($/bag)  4660  122.76  85.39  7.45  642.65 
Farm size (acre)  4660  1186.85  1027.21  8  10040 
H11,ℓℓ
c 41 0.553  0.243  0.180  1 
H12,ℓℓ   37 0.433  0.241  0.147  1 
H12,ℓv 14 0.375  0.235  0.029  0.838 
H13,ℓℓ 20 0.510  0.289  0.143  1 
H14,ℓℓ 36 0.467  0.195  0.194  0.831 
H22,ℓℓ   42 0.599  0.253  0.211  1 
H22,ℓv 15 0.199  0.131  0.010  0.431 
H22,vv 20 0.884  0.193  0.504  1 
H23,ℓℓ 22 0.522  0.256  0.148  1 
H23,vℓ 9 0.544  0.268  0.089  1 
H24,ℓℓ 42 0.548  0.252  0.109  1 
H24,vℓ 15 0.375  0213  0.032  0.717 
H33,ℓℓ 22 0.864  0.224  0.354  1 
H34,ℓℓ 22 0.578  0.193  0.270  1 
H44,ℓℓ 42 0.634  0.213  0.337  1 
a The data contain 4660 observations from 6 CRDs spanning 7 years (2000, 2002-2007). 
b For the market concentration measurements H’s, we only report the summary statistics of those non 
zeros at the CRD level, therefore the number of observations is at most 6×7 = 42. 
c The subscripts for seed types are defined as: 1 for conventional, 2 for HT, 3 for IR, and 4 for HT/IR 
stacked. The subscripts for vertical structure are defined as: ℓ for licensing and v for vertical 
integration. Moreover, by symmetry, 
,, ,,  and  , 
ij ji ij v ji v HH HH ij == ≠
ll ll l l . 
  28Table 2.  OLS and 2SLS estimation with robust standard errors clustered at farm level.
a
OLS 2SLS   
Dependent Variable: Net Price ($/bag)  Coefficient t- 
statistic 
Coefficient Robust  z 
statistic 
Seed type effects, benchmark is T1: Conventional seed 
T2Dℓ (HT under licensing)  79.47***  16.93  85.24***  11.71 
T2Dv (HT under vertical integration)  56.24***  9.86  79.95***  7.37 
T3Dℓ (IR under licensing)  70.18***  6.87  75.13***  4.95 
T3Dv (IR under vertical integration)  121.76***  12.27  130.32***  11.46 
T4Dℓ (stacked seed under licensing)  118.82***  25.38  120.20***  18.81 
T4Dv (stacked seed under vertical integration)  157.32***  27.47  162.88***  25.09 
Market concentration 
H11,ℓℓT1DℓY1ℓ (on conventional seed)  0.113***  3.91  0.198***  4.41 
H21,ℓℓT1DℓY2ℓ (on conventional seed), and 
H12,ℓℓT2DℓY1ℓ (on HT1 under licensing) 
-0.024 -0.53 -0.075  -1.04 
H21,vℓT1DℓY2v (on conventional seed), and  
H12,ℓvT2DvY1ℓ (on HT1 under vertical integration) 
-0.412*** -5.51 -0.715***  -3.61 
H31,ℓℓT1DℓY3ℓ (on conventional seed), and  
H13,ℓℓT3DℓY1ℓ (on IR1 under licensing) 
-0.150 -0.54  -0.636**  -2.03 
H41,ℓℓT1DℓY4ℓ (on conventional seed), and  
H14,ℓℓT4DℓY1ℓ (on stacked seed under licensing) 




H22,ℓvT2DvY2ℓ (on HT under vertical integration)  0.431  0.75  4.249***  3.01 
H22,vvT2DvY2v (on HT under vertical integration)  0.860**  2.26  4.482***  5.09 
H32, ℓvT2DvY3ℓ (on HT under vertical integration), 
and H23,vℓT3DℓY2v (on IR under licensing) 
0.168 0.26  6.824***  3.10 
H42, ℓvT2DvY4ℓ (on HT under vertical integration), 
and H24,vℓT4DℓY2v (on stacked seed under licensing) 
0.094 0.16  -5.735***  -3.36 
H22,ℓℓT2DℓY2ℓ (on HT under licensing)  0.086  0.90  0.061  0.39 
H22,vℓT2DℓY2v (on HT under licensing)  0.366  1.59  1.643***  2.64 
H32,ℓℓT2DℓY3ℓ (on HT under licensing), and 
H23,ℓℓT3DℓY2ℓ (on IR under licensing) 
0.068 0.14 0.937  0.91 
H42,ℓℓT2DℓY4ℓ (on HT under licensing), and  
H24,ℓℓT4DℓY2ℓ (on stacked seed under licensing) 
-0.199* -1.69  -0.495** -2.45 
H33,ℓℓT3DℓY3ℓ (on IR under licensing)  -0.101  -0.04  7.573*  1.74 
H43,ℓℓT3DℓY4ℓ (on IR under licensing), and  
H34,ℓℓT4DℓY3ℓ (on stacked seed under licensing) 
0.261 0.52  -2.665***  -3.01 
H44,ℓℓT4DℓY4ℓ (on stacked under licensing)  0.731***  5.30  1.248***  5.37 
Other variables 
Location (Oklahoma)  8.79  1.62  5.26  0.77 
Year 2004  21.25***  5.38  18.29***  3.26 
Year 2005  -19.91***  -5.75  -25.42***  -4.92 
Year 2006  69.35***  17.91  58.38***  10.43 
Year 2007  77.98***  19.86  76.22***  14.95 
Total cotton acreage by each farm (1000 acre)  -0.448  -0.50  -0.82  -0.63 




a Statistical significance is noted as: * 10% level, ** 5% level, and *** 1 % level;
 The R
2 for the OLS 
estimation is 0.61. For the 2SLS estimation, the centered R
2 is 0.59, and un-centered R
2 is 0.88.
 
b The number of observations differs from the one reported in table 1 because data in 2002 are used for 
instruments only.  
  29Table 3 – Effects of Bundling/Stacking in Different Markets on Seed Prices, $/bag.
a,b
 
Licensed Vertically  integrated   

























































a Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance is noted as: * 10% level, ** 5% 
level, and *** 1% level. 
b Market statistics are based on the Texas market in 2006. 
 
 
  30Table 4 – Simulated Effects of Changing Market Size and Structure (2002-2006).
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N/A N/A N/A 
a Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance is noted as: * 10% level, ** 5% 
level, and *** 1% level.   
 
  31Table 5: Decomposition of the total market power effects, $/bag.
a,,b
Scenario I: from 2002 to 2004  Scenario II: from 2005 to 2006   
Estimated Effect  Standard Error  Estimated Effect  Standard Error 
Conventional Seed, T1
Total  Effect  -4.34*** 1.53  -1.70*** 0.53 
H Effect  0.71  0.98  2.32***  0.50 
Y  Effect  -5.04*** 1.02  -4.02*** 0.82 
Licensed HT Biotech Seed, T2ℓ
Total  Effect  -0.77 4.30  -2.86 2.27 
H Effect  1.58  2.79  -1.14  1.13 
Y  Effect  -2.35 2.01  -1.72 2.09 
Vertically Integrated HT Biotech Seed, T2v
Total Effect  -23.33***  7.30  39.80***  7.67 
H Effect  11.14  10.41  52.28***  16.53 
Y Effect  -34.47**  16.92  -12.47  11.20 
Licensed IR Biotech Seed, T3ℓ
Total  Effect  -8.27 24.19  -3.20 5.92 
H Effect  15.66  11.06  -6.51  16.81 
Y Effect  -23.93  16.94  3.31  17.54 
Licensed HT/IR Stacked Biotech Seed, T4ℓ
Total Effect  12.51  10.20  18.56***  3.09 
H  Effect  15.69*** 5.78  12.99*** 5.16 
Y Effect  -3.18  6.67  5.57  5.24 
a Statistical significance is noted as: * 10% level, ** 5% level, and *** 1 % level.  
b Scenario I includes the years when Bayer CropScience gained market share; scenario II covers the years 
when Monsanto became a vertically integrated biotech firm after merging with an established seed 
company (Stoneville).
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